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In this paper we apply a learning model from machine learning, to a human trading crowd to 
understand why the no trade theorem was rejected.  Our results reveal that trading volume in a 
continuous double auction market is associated with inverse learning curves.  Inverse learning 
results from adverse selection among market takers and strategic advantageous selection among 
market makers.  In contrast to associating adverse selection with market failure in traditional 
competitive market theory, the rules of a double auction market efficiently exploit individual 
differences  among the  trading  crowd to  generate both  large amounts  of trading volume and 
relatively efficient prices. 
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Trading volume in financial markets is large and difficult to explain within the context of a 
classical competitive market characterized by price taking behavior, rational expectations and no 
trade theorems, e.g. Tirole (1982).  The financial economics literature responded to unintuitive 
no trade theorems by introducing some form of bounded rationality.  For example, in finance 
“liquidity” (i.e., noise) traders (e.g., Black (1986); Hellwig (1980); Kyle (November 1985)) are 
introduced to resurrect the intuition that individual differences for processing information, leads 
to trading.  Subsequently the behavioral finance literature has focused upon cognitive biases and 
information processing, motivated by the work of Tversky and Kahneman (1973) to provide 
plausible explanations  of observed financial  market  phenomena
3.  However, as observed by 
Brav, Heaton and Rosenberg (2004). 
  “The  most  important  philosophical  concern  facing  financial  economists  today  is  the 
contest between rational and behavioral finance.  Researchers in the rational paradigm assert that 
behavioral  models  employ  ambiguous  assumptions  of  irrationality  undisciplined  by  rigorous 
mathematics ….. Researchers in the behavioral paradigm criticize the failure of rational finance 
to  generate  meaningful  predictive  successes  and….  fail  to  identify  measurable  economic 
variables.” 
What  makes  this  a  fascinating  philosophical  concern  is  that  both  sides  make  positive 
contributions.  The rational finance model has provided important and substantive insights into 
the  equilibrium  properties  of  financial  markets.    However,  absence  some  type  of  bounded 
rationality it fails to provide a realistic description of the dynamic properties of price discovery 
                                                 
3 Recent books provide a comprehensive introduction to this area e.g., Schleifer (April 2000); Shefrin (2007); Shiller 
(May 2006) which in turn can impact upon equilibrium behavior.  For example, Allan Greenspan, former 
Federal Reserve Bank Chairman, at a congressional hearing on Capitol Hill on Thursday October 
23, 2008, conceded that he had put too much faith in the self correcting power of free markets 
(Andrews (October 23, 2008)).   
Behavioral  finance,  on  the  other  hand,  provides  sharper  insights  into  the  nature  of  the 
bounded rationality which drives trading and influences the success or otherwise of other market 
phenomena.  In this paper we study the interaction between rational and behavioral finance in a 
market setting conducted under controlled conditions using a relative large trading crowd
4.  In 
the markets studied the no trade theorem was strongly rejected even though equilibrium price 
predictions were ultimately supported.  As a result, this setting generated behavior that requires 
both the rational and behavioral finance approaches to describe how markets discover prices.  In 
this paper we study how the market discovers prices  by applying a learning model  developed 
from the field of machine learning. This model provides a new method for studying behavioral 
finance and permits identifying more sharply the systematic behavior that led to the rejection of 
the no trade theorem and the spontaneous generation of noise.  To our knowledge this is the first 
time the behavior of the trading crowd has been studied at this level of behavioral detail.    
Our results reveal the unusual finding that efficient price discovery  was associated with 
“negative learning.”  That is, contrary to a traditional single person learning environment where 
repeated practice improves performance we observe the opposite, and which resulted in efficient 
prices.  We identify two fundamental drivers that underlie this result.  First, the trading crowd 
                                                 
4 The markets were conducted as a sponsored trading competition among the first and second year MSCF students at 
Carnegie Mellon University.  Traders were competing for USD$2,500 prize money plus the sponsoring bank hired 
the top trader.  The markets were conducted on the Financial Trading System (http://www.ftsweb.com) platform 
over the web between the New York and Pittsburgh campuses.  There were 92 traders in the trading crowd and 
hundreds of thousands of transactions were executed.  exhibit individual differences in abilities to assess the intrinsic value of the securities traded 
which when combined with  the price taking rules  of the  double auction market  promoted a 
classical  adverse  selection  problem  among  market  takers.    That  is,  Ackerloff’s  “market  for 
lemons”(1970) was an important driver of trading volume generated from market takers as they 
learned to assess more accurately the intrinsic value of the securities
5.  Second, market makers 
who get to post the bid/ask spread, also exhibited negative learning but for different reasons.  
This subset of the trading crowd exhibits  the opposite to the “lemons phenomena” which we 
refer  to  as  “advantageous  selection,”  because  in  this  case  the  learning  was  associated  with 
mastering the strategic price setting behavior.  These results point to the importance of individual 
differences within the trading crowd constrained by the market’s microstructure, for describing 
market dynamics.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the markets, section 
3 the rules that govern trading in the markets studied. Section 4 then introduces the learning 
model we use to study the behavior of the trading crowd. Section 5 then develops the hypotheses 
and section 6 our methodology and results.  Finally, section 7 provides some discussion and 
conclusions. 
                                                 
5 The seminal paper on Adverse Selection is by Akerlof, George A. (1970). "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488–500 for which he was later 
awarded the Nobel Prize. 
 2.  The Trading Competition 
2.1  The Market Data 
The  data  under  analysis  is  from  the  trading  competition  sponsored  by  a  major  bank 
conducted at Carnegie Mellon University.   The trading crowd consists of both first and second 
year MSCF students  who were competing for the $2,500 prize money
6.  The markets were 
conducted over the web using the Financial Trading System’s platform
7 with price discovery 
using a trading crowd that consisted of 92 students enrolled in both the Pittsburgh and New York 
campuses of Carnegie Mellon
8.  The market comprised of four independent and identical trials. 
Each trial covers three years of calendar time and trading is broken up into three trading periods.  
At the beginning of each trial the trading crowd faces interest rate uncertainty and  there are 
eighty one possible interest rate paths. Over the first two trading periods news is randomly and 
publicly released such that by period three there is a single implied interest rate path.   Each 
trading period lasts for 300 seconds,  and because  there is no  additional news in period three 
traders can form a unified expectation with respect to the intrinsic value of each security.  As a 
result, in period 3 the strong no trade theorem is predicted to hold under the rational finance 
model.  In period 3, two fixed-income security markets remain open referred to as security 1 and 
security 4.  Security 1 is  a three-year coupon bond with face value of $100  that pays a coupon 
payment at the end of each period and both a face value and the final coupon payment at the end 
of period 3.  Security 4, is a 3-year zero-coupon bond that pays a $100 face value at the end of 
period 3.    
                                                 
6 The sponsoring bank hired the top trader to their trading desk. 
7These were conducted using the FTS interactive markets where the students were the trading crowd from which all 
price discovery originated from (http://www.ftsweb.com). 
8 The Pittsburgh students were full time and New York students were primarily part time usually from Wall Street. Under the rational finance model the trading crowd is predicted to discover prices that equal 
the intrinsic value independently of individual preferences.  This is because a rational trader will 
bid to buy at prices up to the point intrinsic value and ask to sell at prices down to the intrinsic 
value.  If every trader is rational, no trades will happen because if every trader is quoting around 
true price, the bid ask spread will envelope the true price and no one is willing to buy or sell to 
avoid  the  opportunity  cost  associated  with  the  trade
9.  However, we  observed  wide  price 
fluctuations and huge trading volumes going on with the two securities in the last session as 
illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 respectively. 
 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here. 
 
The research question is how to explain this trading volume and the dynamic price discovery 
process. The two security markets depicted represent two types of markets.  Security 1 ultimately 
settles down to prices predicted from the rational competitive market theory but the trading 
volume is inconsistent with this theory.  On the other hand the rational competitive market theory 
fails to describe both prices and trading volume for the security 4 marke t depicted in figures 1 
and 2.  Later we will see that this results from strategic as opposed to non strategic price taking 
market behavior.   To understand this distinction in the next section we first describe the rules 
that govern trading in these markets.  This is referred to as the market’s microstructure. 
 
                                                 
9 Technically, the money market rate (the realized interest rate path) is the opportunity cost facing the trading crowd.  
As a result, anyone buying at greater than the intrinsic value is giving up more by withdrawing cash from the money 
market than the yield to maturity they would receive from buying the fixed income security.  Similarly, any trader 
selling below the intrinsic value is forgoing a greater yield to maturity from holding the fixed income security 
relative to what they receive by investing the proceeds from the sale in the money market. 3.  Market Microstructure and Two Kinds of Selection 
3.1  Continuous Double Auction Market   
A continuous double auction market is composed of both market makers and market takers.  
Market makers post bids to buy and asks to sell up to some specified quantity.  Market takers can 
sell to a bid or buy from an ask.  A set of rules govern the allowable trading behavior for these 
two groups which is referred to as the market’s microstructure. For market markers, two rules are 
most relevant here. The price improvement rule says that bids must be increasing and asks must 
be decreasing. The crossing rule says if the bid cross the ask or vice versa (i.e., Bid >= Ask or 
Ask <= Bid) then the order is processed at the minimum quantity (i.e., Min(Bid Quantity, Ask 
Quantity). For market takers, the “first in first served” rule is most relevant here. This rule says 
that the first market taker to submit a market order (i.e., sell to a bid or buy from the ask) gets the 
trade. 
3.2  Adverse Selection versus Advantageous Selection  
The learning problem facing the trading crowd is price discovery (i.e., learning to assess the 
intrinsic value).  The market taking rule will promote adverse selection in the sense that the 
market takers who assess intrinsic value with the most error will accept a bid or ask first. On the 
other side of the market the market making rules (price improvement and crossing) will tend to 
promote advantageous selection because the price improvement rule combined with crossing 
rewards the most competitive market makers.  Advantageous selection is the opposite to adverse 
selection, in the sense that the rules of market promote the survival of the most skilled market 
makers.   
In a price taking competitive market, the market makers who are better able to assess the 
intrinsic value will remain as the active bids and asks in the market, under the price improvement and crossing rules.  If the competitive price taking behavior assumption is relaxed in lieu of 
strategic market making behavior, then the learning problem facing this subset of the trading 
crowd changes.  For this latter case, market makers are learning how to generate profits from 
market liquidity relative to the posted bid/ask spread.  In this case either the bid or ask can 
systematically vary from the predicted intrinsic value if liquidity is available in the market.  For 
example, see security 4 in figures 1 and 2 as providing an example of strategic market making 
behavior.  Once again, the price improvement and crossing rules will promote advantageous 
selection among market makers for the case where the bid/ask spread is treated as a strategic 
variable. 4.  The Learning Model 
4.1  Motivation 
The learning model (the Additive  Factor Model) by  Cen, Koedinger  and Junker (2006) 
introduced in this section was used to model human performance in intelligent tutoring systems 
(a computer program with artificial intelligence to teach students).  We applied this model to 
capture  how  the  trading  crowd  learns  the  intrinsic  value  of  the  securities  via  trading  in  a 
continuous  double  auction  market.    Each  trader’s  learning  is  inferred  from  whether  she  has 
correctly executed appropriate trading strategies, as either a market maker or a market taker, 
when repeated opportunities arise.  Here we define “correct” relative to the intrinsic value of a 
security as defined by the rational finance model.  
4.2  The Additive Factor Model (AFM)  
This model also has a connection with Item Response Theory Linden and Hambleton (1997), 
the standard theory in intelligent tests. It starts with four assumptions that we adapted to the 
trading scenario as follows.  
1.  Different traders may initially know more or less. Thus, we use an intercept parameter 
(iin equation for each trader. 
2. Traders learn at the same rate. Thus, slope parameters (jin equation 1.1 do not depend 
on student. This is a simplifying assumption to reduce the number of parameters in equation 2.  
Importantly, it provides a description of the marginal trader learning behavior which is important 
to any concept of a competitive equilibrium in economics.  
3. Some skills are more likely to be relatively easy or difficult to apply. That is, more skilled 
traders will find it relatively easier to apply than will less skilled traders.  The parameters (jin equationfor each production, provide a description of the marginal trader behavior for this 
dimension of the trading problem.   
4. Some skills are easier to learn than others. Thus, we need a slope parameter for each skill.  
This  is  represented  by  the  slope  parameter  being  estimated  relative  to  each  of  the  skills  in 
equation 1.1. 
Based on the assumptions, AFM takes the form depicted by equation.  
  log
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where 
ijt P  = the probability of the i
th trader applying the j
th skill right on its t
th opportunity 
i X  = the i
th trader 
j Y  = the j
th skill 
jt T  = the t
th opportunities practiced on the j
th skill 
jt jT Y  = the interaction between a skill and its number of practice opportunities  
i   = the i
th trader’s prior knowledge 
j  = the easiness/difficulty of applying the j
th skill  
j  = the learning rate of the j
th skill   
Formally, this model captures that the probability for trader i to get trade  j  right relative to 
the rational finance model, is proportional to the trader’s prior knowledge plus “easiness” of 
applying the skill and the learning of the intrinsic value through time. 
 
4.3  Relating the Learning Model to Trading 
For  our  settings,  we  defined  the  skills  a  trader  may  apply  under  the  rules  governing 
exchange in the market. For the two securities in the trading competition, we define two skills for market makers – bidding and asking, and two skills for market takers – buying and selling. A 
rational description of market making in the competition predicts that a market maker should not 
bid above an asset’s intrinsic value or ask below the intrinsic value. Thus, we define a correct 
execution of a bid to be bidding at a price no higher than the asset’s intrinsic value, and ask to be 
asking at price no lower than the intrinsic value. Accordingly, we have four market taking skills 
defined in this study – BidC3, AskC3, BidZ3, and AskZ3. 
Similarly, we apply the same rule to buying and selling.  According to the common notion 
of “Buy Low and Sell High”, buying is defined to be correctly executed if a trader buys the 
security when the asset’s intrinsic value is above the best ask. Selling is defined to be correctly 
executed if a trader sells when the asset’s intrinsic value is below the best bid. Thus, we have 
four market taking skills defined in this study – BuyC3, SellC3, BuyZ3, and SellZ3. 5.  Hypotheses 
 
The problem facing the trading crowd is price discovery (i.e., learning to assess the intrinsic 
value).   We start first with the traditional economic assumption that behavior in a competitive 
market is non strategic or “price taking.”  The market taking rule is predicted to promote adverse 
selection among market takers because the market takers who assess intrinsic value with the 
most error  can  accept  a bid  or ask first.   The  market  making rules  (price improvement  and 
crossing)  will  tend  to  promote  advantageous  selection  among  non  strategic  market  makers 
because those who are better able to assess the intrinsic value are predicted remain as the active 
bids and asks in the market under the price improvement and crossing rules. Hypotheses 1-3, 
stated in their null form, apply to a traditional competitive price taking market. 
Hypothesis  1  –  market  makers  and  market  takers  have  the  same  prior  knowledge,  i.e. 
MM MT     
Hypothesis 2 – market makers and market takers have equal skills, i.e.  MM MT   . 
Hypothesis 3 – market makers and market takers have the same learning, i.e.  0 MM MT   . 
 
 
 6.  Methodology and Results 
6.1  Model Results 
The large trading crowd generated a large number of trades (hundreds of thousands) when 
trading  on  the  FTS  electronic  markets  which  allowed  obtaining  measurements  of  important 
variables using 1-second intervals of time.  The learning model was fitted by trial (there were 
four trials) for each trader and the presence of systematic behavior was tested for.  Formally, the 
dependent variable, the log odds of the probability of the i’th trader applying the j’th skill on it’s 
t’th opportunity correctly is constructed using 1-second intervals of time.  That is, time for each 
trading period is broken up into 1-second intervals and the learning model is estimated from the 
set of transactions within each 1-second interval.  
6.1.1  Binomial Test on Trader Prior Knowledge Coefficients 
We first compare the prior information of market makers and market takers across the four 
trials and the two securities.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Table 1 summarizes the results from fitting the learning model
10 and provides the average 
knowledge parameters by MM/MT, security and trial.  Table 1 reveals t hat in each cell the 
market making market taking pair was such that the average knowledge parameter was higher for 
the market maker.  This was significant using a sign test at the  p-value = 0.007812 level.
11  The 
results from table 1 provide a qualified rejection of hypothesis 1 and lend support to the intuitive 
                                                 
10 We fit the model using a ridge logistic regression model fitting algorithm with the Broyden–Fletcher–Goldfarb–
Shanno (BFGS) method. 
11 Within each trial, the t-statistic for the mean difference of market maker and market taker prior knowledge did not 
attain significance given the size of the error among  traders. conjecture that informational differences provide one driver of trading volume. Further the sign 
test demonstrates that across trials and securities the market makers are more knowledgeable 
than market takers on average. 
 
6.1.2  Binomial Test on Skill Coefficients 
Insert Table 2 about here 
 
Table 2 summarizes results from fitting the learning model and provides the learning and 
skill coefficients for the thirty two conditions assessed (4 trials times MM versus MT times 4 
skills for each MM and MT).  The bottom half of the table provides the coefficients for MT’s 
and the top half the coefficients for MM’s.  First, a pronounced relationship is observed between 
skill differences for MM (Bid, Ask rows) versus MT (Buy, Sell rows).  The skill parameters for 
MM’s are positive and become increasingly positive across trials.  The opposite is observed for 
MT’s. The binomial test on the sign difference of the paired market making and market taking 
skills is highly significant with p-value = 3.052e-05. This rejects the second hypothesis. These 
results reveal that the market makers exhibit increasing mastery of the skills as indicated by the 
increasing positive coefficient trend.  The market takers on the other hand revealed that the their 
skills became increasingly more difficult to apply.  For MT’s these trends are consistent with the 
presence of adverse selection, the “market for lemons” problem studied by Akerlof
12.  Just as the 
existence bad used cars drive out the good used cars in the Akerlof market, table 2 reflects that 
the existence of the less skilled MT’s are driving out the more skilled MT’s by accepting less 
                                                 
12 The seminal paper on Adverse Selection is by Akerlof, George A. (1970). "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism". Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488–500. favorable bids/asks from the MM’s.  That is, under the price taking rules for a double auction 
market it is strictly “first in first served” and so when studying the set of active market takers it is 
the less skilled MT’s who will move first.  This gives rise to the equivalent of a “lemons” effect 
as revealed by Table 2 where the skill parameters for MT’s are negative and become increasingly 
negative across the repeated independent trials.   
On the MM side of the market the price improvement rule of the double auction institution 
provides a mechanism for trading that has induced the complete opposite effect.  Under the price 
improvement rule bids have to increase and asks have to decrease in a continuous double auction 
institution.  As a result, over time this rule ensures that the bid/ask spreads tend to decline.  Table 
2 reveals that under this rule it is the most competitive market makers who remain because 
MM’s skills are positive and increasing across the trials.  That is, in this trading mechanism it is 
the skilled MM’s who are driving out the less skilled MM’s. 
6.1.3  Binomial Test on Learning Coefficients 
In addition to the skill parameters, Table 2 also depicts the Learning coefficients by MM, 
MT, Trial and Security.  The actual learning curves estimated from the learning model for both 
MM’s and MT’s by security and trial is provided in Figures 5-8, appendix 1.  Inverted learning 
curves  are immediately  apparent  from the results  provided in  Table 2.   That  is,  there are  a 
predominate number pf negative slope parameters observed associated with each cell of table 2..  
Negative learning coefficients were observed for 13/16 of the MT cells and 10/16 of the MM 
cells.  We test for the existence of negative learning using a statistical test of the null hypothesis 
that  the  probability  “p”  of  a  positive  learning  coefficient  equals  0.5,  against  the  alternative 
hypothesis that p is not equal to 0.5.  An exact binomial test of the null hypothesis was conducted 
and which rejected the null hypothesis at a probability less than 0.0006.   Combined the results from Tables 1 and 2 are clear for market takers.  In a price taking (i.e., 
non strategic) competitive market the adverse selection problem created by the market taking 
acceptance rule resulted in the less skilled MT’s driving out the relative more skilled MT’s over 
repeated exposures of trading opportunities.  For the market making side, however, we observed 
the opposite to adverse selection, which we refer to as advantageous selection.  Surprisingly this 
behavior also resulted in inverse learning being observed for MM’s.  In the next section we 
explore this behavior further by allowing for strategic or non price taking behavior among the 
MM’s. 
6.2  Inverted Learning and Strategic Market Making Behavior 
In a single person learning environment (without competition), we expect to see an upward 
learning curve which represents increasing proficiency with increased exposure.  
 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
 
However,  in  the  competitive  markets  studied  in  this  paper  as  discussed  in  the  previous 
section we usually observed an inverted learning curve as depicted in Figure 4, being generated 
from  the  price  discovery  dynamics.    For  MT’s  the  driver  of  this  was  an  adverse  selection 
problem relative to ability for assessing the intrinsic value.  For MM’s however, we observe 
advantageous selection and in this section we explore advantageous selection in the presence of 
strategic or non price taking behavior. 
 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
 By relaxing the price taking assumption we allow for the fact that the bid/ask spread is a strategic 
variable for MM’s.  This is plausible because MM’s have two ways of making money in the 
market.  First, they can attempt to buy or sell advantageously relatively to their assessed intrinsic 
value.  Under non strategic advantageous selection we would expect to see more success with 
repeated exposures.  Second, MM’s can attempt to earn the spread by exploiting the available 
liquidity from MT’s.  In real world markets it is not uncommon for MM’s to pay for liquidity 
and  in  the  markets  studied  in  this  paper  “payment”  is  endogenous  to  the  strategic  bid/ask 
variable.    From  this  second  approach  the  learning  problem  facing  MM’s  is  to  assess  the 
relationship  among  MT’s,  spreads  and  liquidity.    We  will  explore  strategic  MM  using  a 
regression approach where the dependent variable is defined as: 
- BASpread BestAsk BestBid   
We analyze the drivers of this spread formally using the following variables.  Each variable 
is measured over successive 1-second intervals of time to capture the dynamic behavior of price 
discovery.  The first set of drivers, are variables that are predicted to be important in a setting 
where prices arise from the strategic interactions between the different roles within the trading 
crowd themselves.  These are: 
MTPriorKnowledge – the average prior trading knowledge  i  of active market takers in the 
market. The higher the statistic, the more competent the active market takers. 
MTEasiness – the average easiness  j   of the skills used by the active market takers. The 
higher the statistic, the easier to do market taking. 
MTLearningRate  --  the  average  learning  rate  j  of  the  skills used  by  the  active market 
takers. The higher the statistic, the easier to do market taking over time MMPriorKnowledge – the average prior trading knowledge  i  of active market makers in 
the market. The higher the statistic, the more competent the active market makers. 
MMEasiness – the average easiness  j   of the skills used by the active market makers. The 
higher the statistic, the easier to do market making. 
MMLearningRate  -- the average learning rate  j  of the skills  used by the active market 
making. The higher the statistic, the easier to do market making over time 
MTSuccess  –  the  average  success  rates  of  the  active  market  takers  computed  across  1-
second intervals of time. 
MMSuccess – the average success rates of active market makers computed across 1-second 
intervals of time. 
An additional set of potential drivers, resulting from the variables predicted under standard 
competitive pricing taking theory.  These variables are listed next. 
MTCount – the number of market taking trades 
MMCount – the number of market making trades 
MTVol – the average volume in thousands per market taking trade 
MMVol – the average volume in thousands per market making trade 
The strategy available to MM’s is the ability to post the prices for which they are willing to 
buy  and  sell  at  subject  to  the  price  improvement  rule.    As  a  result,  we  conduct  a  multiple 
regression analysis using the posted prices (i.e., the bid/ask spread) as the dependent variable.  
This regression will allow the dynamics of bid-ask spreads and the strategic interactions between 
market takers and market makers to be more formally described.  The results are provided in 
Table 3.  This table displays the OLS parameter fits and their p-values.  First, the MM success variable was significant and positive for three out of four trials.  That is, market makers all other 
things being equal are more likely to apply skills correctly the wider they can maintain spreads. 
 
Insert Table 3 about here 
 
Prior knowledge of the active MM’s was significant in three out of four trials and marginally 
significant in the other trial (trial number 2).  The relationship is negative which implies that the 
more knowledgeable market makers are the more spreads tend to narrow.  Thus across trials 
MM’s skill, success and prior knowledge are influencing what bids and asks are being posted 
especially for trials 3 and 4.  Note each of these variables reinforce the positive skill trends 
observed in Tables 1 & 2 for MM’s driven by the advantageous selection among market makers.  
Negative learning associated with spreads was significant for the MM in trials 3 and 4 and 
for MT’s in trials 1-2 (trial 2 was at the 10% level of significance).  This result combined with 
the trends for MM’s in terms of skill, success and prior knowledge reveal the different nature of 
the learning problems facing the MT’s and MM’s.  MM’s are exploiting the adverse selection 
problem to earn a wider spread from MT’s when they are learning to better assess the intrinsic 
value  of  the  securities.    In  later  trials  competition  among  more  informed/skilled  MM’s  has 
increased and the nature of the MM’s learning problem has changed to learning how to generate 
MM revenue from trading volume and spreads. .  The negative learning is defined relative to the 
intrinsic  value  as  spreads  shrink,  but  observe  that  this  coincides  with  trading  volume  (i.e., 
liquidity) becoming significant in trial 4.  In other words, the second method of earning market 
making profits  from  liquidity and spreads  is  being detected in  the regression analysis.  The 
negative coefficient implies volume increase as spreads shrink.  In the real world MM’s pay for trading volume, and in the current markets negative learning coefficients from the skilled MM’s 
provide the endogenous equivalent to paying for trading volume. 
 7.  Conclusion 
This paper studies the interaction between rational and behavioral finance in a market setting 
where the no trade theorem was strongly rejected even though equilibrium price predictions were 
ultimately supported.  We describe how individual differences within the market’s trading crowd 
combined with the rules of the double auction institution, resulted in relatively efficient price 
discovery.  We adapt a learning model from machine learning, to study trading crowd behavior 
at  both  an  individual  and  marginal  trader  level  for  market  makers  and  takers.    This  model 
identified the importance of adverse selection for the market takers in the trading crowd and 
strategic advantageous selection for the market makers in the trading crowd.     
For market takers, it was individual differences with respect to skills related to assessing the 
intrinsic  value  that  created  the  adverse  selection  problem.    Individual  differences  along  this 
dimension  resulted  in  a  “market  for  lemons”  effect  whereby  the  skilled  market  takers  were 
driven out by the relatively less skilled market takers under the price taking rules of the double 
auction market institution.  On the MM side the price setting rule in the double auction is a price 
improvement rule (bids must increase, asks must decrease) combined with the use of spreads as a 
strategic variable that generated strategic advantageous selection on the market making side.  
That is, contrary to what was observed on the MT siding on the MM side it was the skilled MM’s 
who drove out the less skilled MM’s because the smaller the bid/ask spread the more competitive 
it  is  but  it  can  imply  violations  of  intrinsic  value  predictions  to  promote  trading  liquidity.  
Together, these dynamics led to the rejection of the strong no trade theorem and efficient price 
discovery.   
Finally, in  contrast  to  the usual implications  that adverse selection can result in  market 
failure, the rules of the double auction institution combined with a boundedly rational trading crowd, exploit these offsetting “selection problems” between the MT’s and MM’s to promote 
liquidity resulting in the rejection of the no trade theorem and relatively efficient price discovery 
behavior.  In future work we will test for the presence of this phenomenon as a driver of price 
discovery in real world markets using the Nasdaq Level 2 quotes. 
  
Trial  1  2  3  4 
Security  1  4  1  4  1  4  1  4 
MM  1.31  0.27  0.40  0.48  0.37  0.36  0.55  1.49 
MT  -1.48  0.03  0.33  0.01  -0.06  -0.10  -0.54  -0.14 
 
Table 1 Compare the prior information of traders.The parameters in this table are the average of the 
individual trader prior knowledge parameters,  i resulting from fitting the learning model to the two 
active subsets of the trading crowd, market makers and market takers for each trial.  This is the average 
knowledge parameter for the marginal market maker and taker. 
  
   Trial    
   1  2  3  4 
SkillName 
  
      
  
      
  
      
  
      
Bid1  2.4  0.1  2.65  -0.1  1.82  0  7.65  -0.01 
Bid4  5  -0.06  3.46  -0.14  6.29  -0.1  7.81  -0.08 
Ask1  2.59  0.03  3.08  -0.01  3.17  0.02  6.33  -0.03 
Ask4  2.49  0  2.5  -0.02  3.04  0.01  5.27  -0.16 
Buy1  -3.78  -0.01  -3.57  -0.03  -3.8  -0.01  -4.11  0.04 
Buy4  -1.01  -0.02  -0.84  -0.13  -2.73  -0.04  -4.34  -0.02 
Sell1  -2.97  -0.05  -1.88  0  -1.37  -0.05  -8.23  -0.02 
Sell4  -2.72  -0.02  -2.33  -0.02  -3.83  -0.03  -7.81  0 
Table 2 Skill easiness and learning rates over the four trials. β is the skill easiness and γ is the skill 
learning rate coefficients, resulting from fitting the learning model to trading crowd for each trial. The 
parameters in this table are the marginal trader parameters. 
  
 
  1  2  3  4 
  Estimates  p  Estimates  p  Estimates  p  Estimates  p 
(Intercept)  -3.50  0.02*  -0.86  0.54  -0.77  0.79  -2.94  0.12 
MTPriorKnowledge  0.07  0.46  -0.01  0.47  0.03  0.64  -0.06  0.00** 
MTEasiness  -0.84  0.00**  0.01  0.97  -0.88  0.07  0.08  0.45 
MTLearningRate  -96.14  0.00**  -5.38  0.09  -23.39  0.45  4.66  0.50 
MTSuccess  0.22  0.83  0.39  0.45  1.16  0.30  -0.11  0.88 
MTCount  -0.05  0.27  -0.01  0.66  -0.02  0.67  0.03  0.19 
MTVol  0.00  0.91  0.05  0.01**  0.05  0.14  0.02  0.29 
MMPriorKnowledge  -0.12  0.01**  -0.03  0.09  -0.13  0.00**  -0.04  0.00** 
MMEasiness  0.10  0.79  0.27  0.55  -1.09  0.02*  0.24  0.22 
MMLearningRate  -6.27  0.42  5.75  0.04*  -38.74  0.01**  -15.87  0.00** 
MMSuccess  4.39  0.00**  0.87  0.25  4.15  0.01**  4.78  0.00** 
MMCount  -0.02  0.62  -0.01  0.71  0.00  1.00  -0.03  0.11 
MMVol  -0.05  0.11  -0.01  0.64  -0.05  0.14  -0.05  0.01** 
 
Table 3 The parameter estimates and their p-values with OLS from Model I across the four trials. The 
cells where the p-values are less than .05 are highlighted.  The dependent variable in the regression results 
reported in Table 2 is the bid/ask spread for the market measured over successive 1-second intervals of 
time to capture the dynamic behavior of price discovery in the market.  The predictor variables are the 
coefficients  from  the  learning  model  (MT  =  Market  Takers,  MM  =  Market  Makers)  plus  variables 
constructed from standard competitive market theory (Count = number of MM’s or MT’s, Vol = Traded 
volume for MM’s and MT’s, Success is the traded price defined relative to the predicted intrinsic value 
for MM’s and MT’s.  
 
 
Figure 1 Prices of two securities. The y-axis in this graph represents the bid/ask deviations around the 
predicted intrinsic value of each security.  The x-axis represents time and the path of bids and asks is 
plotted for period 3 of one trial.   The Security 1 example, depicts a market where after initial volatility in 
the bids and asks the market settles down to the predicted intrinsic value.  The Security 4 example depicts 
a market where bid/ask spread volatility sustained throughout the period and prices remained above the 
predicted intrinsic value.  
 
 
Figure  2  Trading  volumes  of  the  two  securities.  The  y-axis  represents  trading  volume  in  contracts 
exchanged for the security markets and trial depicted in Figure 1.  The x-axis again represents time.    
Figure 3 Classroom learning curve. The x-axis measures the number of times the user is exposed to the 
task and the y-axis measure the proficiency of performance.  
Figure  4  Inverted  Learning  in  a  Competitive  Market.  The  x-axis  measures  the  number  of  times  the 
marginal trader is exposed to the bid/ask/buy/sell conditions and the y-axis measure the proficiency of 
performance. Appendix 1 
 
 
Figure 5 Learning curves in trial 1 period 3. The x-axis is the number of times the Bid/Ask/Buy/Sell 
opportunity was repeated during the period.  The y-axis is success rate defined relative to the predicted 
intrinsic value of the security.  The solid lines are the actual success rates of using each skill across the 
ordered number of practices. The dotted lines are the success rates predicted by the AFM model.  
  
Figure 6 Learning curves in trial 2 period 3. The x-axis is the number of times the Bid/Ask/Buy/Sell 
opportunity was repeated during the period.  The y-axis is success rate defined relative to the predicted 
intrinsic value of the security.  The solid lines are the actual success rates of using each skill across the 
ordered number of practices. The dotted lines are the success rates predicted by the AFM model.  
  
Figure 7 Learning curves in trial 3 period 3. The x-axis is the number of times the Bid/Ask/Buy/Sell 
opportunity was repeated during the period.  The y-axis is success rate defined relative to the predicted 
intrinsic value of the security.  The solid lines are the actual success rates of using each skill across the 
ordered number of practices. The dotted lines are the success rates predicted by the AFM model.   
Figure 8 Learning curves in trial 4 period 3. The x-axis is the number of times the Bid/Ask/Buy/Sell 
opportunity was repeated during the period.  The y-axis is success rate defined relative to the predicted 
intrinsic value of the security.  The solid lines are the actual success rates of using each skill across the 
ordered number of practices. The dotted lines are the success rates predicted by the AFM model.   
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